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ARTICLES
PAUL'S PERVERTED PRIVILEGES OR THE
TRUE MEANING OF THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF ARTICLE FOUR
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU "
The thrust of this article is simply stated: that for virtually a hundred
years-since Paul v. Virginia' in 1868-the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourth Article of the Constitution of the United States
has been misinterpreted by the Supreme Court and generally misunder-
stood by scholars.
In restricting the Privileges and Immunities of the Fourth Article
possessed by a citizen of one state sojourning in another to only those
rights given to its people by the second state, the Supreme Court in
Paul v. Virginia tragically perverted the clause, whose purpose was to
protect the natural, basic, fundamental rights of such citizens.
This error can largely be attributed to Justice Field. And it is here
suggested that he soon realized he had been mistaken in so emasculating
the clause.
Except for the Ward decision 2 two years later-where the Court
properly accorded the basic, fundamental right interpretation to this
Privileges and Immunities Clause-later courts and commentators have
simply uncritically accepted the Paul decision.
The significance of the error is profound. The Fourth Article is not
only a limitation upon state actions but, when read together with the
necessary and proper clause, it provides constitutional power to the
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, B.S. Detroit instute of
Technology (1934); J.B. Detroit College of Law (1940); L.L.M. Umversity of Mich-
igan (1950); SJ.D. Umversity of Michigan (1951). Author of CoMMENTAmEs oN TM
CONSTITUTION OF TUE UNITED STATES and contributor to numerous legal publications.
1. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
2. Ward v. Maryland 81 U.S. (12 Wall.) 430 (1870).
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federal Congress to protect American citizens in their privileges and
immunities of citizenship, i.e., their natural, fundamental rights, against
invasions by either states or individuals. The "state action" limitation
upon congressional civil rights legislation, supposedly flowing from the
Fourteenth Amendment, that has haunted American constitutional law,
is simply irrelevant and unnecessary.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth Article had
its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation. In the Second Con-
tinental Congress a committee had been appointed to propose articles
of confederation. On July 12, 1776, the committee came forward with
a draft of two, inter alia, articles. They follow:
Art. VI. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always
have the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and Advantages, in the
other Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases
whatever, except in those provided for by the next following
Article. Art. VII. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all
the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and Advantages in Trade, Naviga-
tion, and Commerce, in any other Colony, and in going to and
from the same and to any Part of the World, which the Natives
of such Colony Enjoy.3
The original manuscript of this draft is in the handwriting of John
Dickinson and it is generally agreed that he was the author of these two
proposed articles.
On August 20, 1776, the Continental Congress printed a second draft
of its contemplated articles. For some reason which is not now known,
the proposed articles mentioned above were not included in the draft.'
The following year another committee was appointed to consider the
desirability of additional articles not included in the draft of August
20, 1776. This committee on November 11, 1777, proposed the inclusion
of what was to become later the Fourth Article.5 Only slight changes
were made in the days following and on November 15, 1777, the con-
gress approved the inclusion of an article worded thus:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different states in this union, the
3. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 547 (1906).
4. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 676 (1906).
5. 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 888-9 (1906).
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free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds .and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people
of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from anv
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions,
as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided that such restric-
tions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property,
imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner
is an inhabitant; provided also, that no Imposition, duties, or re-
striction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United
States, or either of them.6
It should immediately be apparent that John Dickinson and the com-
mittee had in mind not one article, but two different ones, and that
the article as finally adopted contains two distinctly different "privi-
lege" guarantees. The first assures to "the free inhabitants of each of
several states," in other words all the basic, fundamental, natural rights
of men-not only citizens, but all "inhabitants", while the second is a
totally different privileges clause, one of comity or interstate equality
to protect merchants and others in states other than their own. That
the Dickinson draft and the final article both contained two totally
different privileges clauses has been overlooked, and almost inevitably
the meaning of the first clause has been misunderstood by many It must
ever be remembered that it was the first privileges clause in the Articles
that was adopted in the Constitution of the Umted States, and with
which we are now concerned. It must be re-emphasized: the first clause
was not the one intended to protect merchants and citizens of one state
who conducted their affairs in other states; these were to be protected
under the second privileges clause. We can be sure that the wording of
the first clause was no accident-the members of the Continental Con-
gress in common with all their generation in America accepted the
doctrine of natural rights and understood that such rights belonged not
only to citizens but to all men within the state, to "inhabitants." In' so
choosing the Continental Congress evidenced its desire that the protec-
tion of the Articles extend to Negroes and aliens, among others.
On June 22, 1778, the Maryland delegates moved to strike out the
word "paupers" and add as a proviso, "That one state shall not be
burthened with the maintenance of the poor who may remove into it
6. 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908-9 (1906).
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from any of the others in this union." It was voted down, with only
Maryland voting in the affirmative.
7
On June 25, 1778, the South Carolina delegates moved to insert the
word "white" between "free" and "inhabitants." Only Virginia joined
in supporting this motion and it was resoundingly defeated.8 There
could hardly be any stronger evidence that free Negroes were to be
safeguarded in their privileges and immunities under the Articles.
Writing nine years later of the language used in Article Four of the
Articles of Confederation, James Madison was critical. In Federalist
Paper Number 42, he wrote:
There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why
the terms 'free inhabitants' are used in one part of the article,
'free citizens' in another, and 'people' in another; or what was
meant by superadding to 'all privileges and immunities of free
citizens,' 'all the privileges of trade and commerce' cannot easily
be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable,
however, that those who come under the denomination of 'free
inhabitants' of a State, although not citizens of such State, are en-
tided, in every other State, to all the privileges of 'free citizens'
of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be en-
tided to in their own State; so that it may be in the power of a
particular State, or rather every State is laid under a necessity, not
only to confer the rights of citizenship in other states upon any
whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any
whom it may allow to become inhabitants within the jurisdic-
tion.2
In common with many other enthusiastic salesmen for the new con-
stitution, Madison was not always fair to the Founding Fathers who
gave us both independence and the Articles of Confederation. The
Continental Congress desired to protect more than citizens. The original
Dickinson draft extended its guarantees to all "inhabitants" and it can
be conjectured safely that the qualifying adjective "free" had to be
added to secure the agreement of the slave-holding states.
At the time the Articles of Confederation were adopted the over-
whelming majority of Americans accepted the doctrine of natural rights.
All men possessed certain basic, fundamental rights which government
could not deny. Government was organized to protect and safeguard
7. 11 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRFSS 631 (1906).
8. I1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 652 (1906).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Madison).
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these rights. It was the unspoken assumption in-the Continental Con-
gress that no state could ever justifiably deny to its own citizens their
natural rights. It was unthinkable that the possessors of political power
needed the protection of the Articles of Confederation against their
temporary trustees of governance; these men who had fought and
sacrificed against the Crown in defense of their natural rights would
protect themselves against their elected officeholders. The purpose of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause was to provide that the same
natural and fundamental rights, "the privileges and immunities of free
citizens," were to be honored when citizens from other states came into
the commonwealth. Such citizens had no political power in the second
state and perforce had to rely upon the Articles for comparable pro-
tection. In plain words, all American citizens were to be equally pro-
tected from state action or inaction that denied men their natural rights,
privileges and immunities.
Lastly, let us note the literal language of the article in question. The
phrase "in the several states" does not indicate where the privileges are
to be available. If this would have been the draftmen's intent, they
would have inserted the phrase after the word "entitled." The phrase
appended as it is to the preceding "free Citizens" means free citizens
of the several states, or free citizens of the United States, a reference
just then becoming popular.
Perhaps in passing it should be pointed out that the states, at the time
they adopted the Articles of Confederation, stood in relation to each
other as independent sovereigns. The rights to be protected by the
Articles were the basic, fundamental rights commonly recognized by
the international community as belonging to free men, "the privileges
and immunities of free citizens." 10
The United States functioned under the Articles of Confederation
for too short a time for there to be either authorative judicial decisions
or definitive practice illuminating the Privileges and Immunities Clau5e
of the Fourth Article.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
munities of Citizens in the several States."
10. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 128 (1936). Note
also: BuIRNsT, ThE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 257 (1941); JENsEN, THz ARTicLEs OF CON-
FEDERAnON (1963).
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It was in this language that the clause was first proposed by Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina on May 29, 1787, in the constitutional
convention.'" It was in this same language that the clause was submitted
to the convention by the Committee on Detail on August 6, 1787, as a
proposed Article XIV.12
On August 28, 1787, the convention voted to adopt the clause as re-
ported, with all states voting in the affirmative, except South Carolina
which voted nay and Georgia which was divided. 13
There had been a minimum of discussion about the clause in the con-
vention. It had obviously been directly patterned after the earlier
clause in the Articles of Confederation which had received general ap-
probation. Alexander Hamilton possessed a plan for a constitution which
he never formally presented to the convention, but which was covered
in large part by his speeches to the group, especially one on June 18,
1787. Hamilton's proposed constitution included an article in these
words: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to the rights, priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens in every other State." 14 The only re-
ported debate on the clause as accepted by the convention was on
August 28, 1787. On that date it is noted: "General Pinckney was not
satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some provision should be included
in favor of property in slaves." 15
In comparison with the wording of Article Four of the Articles of
Confederation it is immediately obvious that the clause dropped was the
interstate commercial privileges clause and the one retained was the
fundamental, natural right clause. The draftsmen of the Constitution,
then, were not primarily concerned with protecting peddlers in their
interstate peregrinations. They were concerned with protecting human
dignity and the basic rights of free men everywhere in the nation.
Why did the convention replace the word "inhabitants" with the
narrower term "citizens," it may be asked. The true explanation is that
bf Judge Ridgely of Delaware, writing in 1821 at a time when he could
well recall the events of the constitutional convention. The change of
'language, he wrote, was deemed necessary to correct what was often
:thought of as an unfortunate inadequacy and peril under the Articles,
to,-wit, that one state might permit a number of undesirables to im-
J.J. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 145 (2d ed., 1836).
12. Id. at 229.
.13. Id. at 272.
14. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 629 (1937).
15. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 487 (2d ed. 1836).
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migrate and then shortly-without ever having honored them with
ibitizenship-sent them off into other states which would have to support
them as former "inhabitants" of the previous state. 16
Let it be stated igain that the generation that gave us the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution believed solidly in the doctrine of
natural Y-ights. They understood that the purpose of government was to
protect men in their basic, natural rights, and they were sure that they
could hold their own state governments to this end. The federal gov-
ernment, however, would have to protect Americans when they visited
in other states where they had no political power. It was the Fourth
Article of the new constitution that recognized this need, with con-
comitant power to effectuate the obligation, in the federal government.
The government had barely begun to function under the Constitu-
tion when the United States Supreme Court gave evidence that it
shared the political philosophy of the larger community. They were,
said the Court in 1793, "natural, inherent and unalienable rights of man,"
such as the property right.17 It can hardly be questioned that the mem-
bers of that Court would have protected this natural right of an Ameri-
can citizen when negated by a state other than his own-under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth Article.
In the Federalist Papers the only significant discussion of the clause
was provided by Alexander Hamilton. Writing in Number Eighty,
he was there suggesting that the federal courts should have jurisdiction
when the privileges and immunities of the Fourth Article were allegedly
violated. Speaking of the clause he indicated that the rights to be pro-
tected would be the fundamental rights possessed by all citizens of the
several or united states. He wrote:
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that 'the citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all ... privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several States.' And if it be a just principle that
every government ought to possess the means of executing its own
provisions by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to
the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and im-
munities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the
national judicary ought to preside in all cases in which one State
or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens.
18
16. Douglas v. Stephens, 1 Del Ch 465,469 (1821).
17. VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1793)-.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 238 (Hamilton).
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Note well that Hamilton understood that the "several states" clause
does not refer to where the rights will be available, but to the kinds of
rights protected: "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the sev-
eral States." Again, the rights according to Hamilton are not favors
granted by either a state of origin or a state of sojourn, but "privileges
and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled."
Certainly to Hamilton the machinery of the United States could be used
as a result of the Fourth Article to protect all our citizens in their funda-
mental privileges and immunities.
Fortunately, early judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Article
are available and they strikingly support the interpretation here urged.
Only ten years after the article was drafted, it came before the Mary-
land Court for construction. Judge Chase, speaking for the Court, said:
"By the second section of the Fourth Article of the Constitution of the
United States, the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." 19 One of the priv-
ileges and immunities, ruled the Court, was the right of "citizens of the
several states to acquire and hold real property in any of the states." 20
The meaning of the clause is this, said Chase: "It secures and protects
personal rights." 21 It is crystal clear from the opinion that the rights
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause are the basic, funda-
mental rights, such as the property right. Furthermore, the opinion in-
dicates without any uncertainty that the rights to be protected are not
simply those a second state decides in its largesse to extend to its own
people, but "all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
states," in other words, the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. Just as Hamilton had pointed out in the Federalist Papers,
Judge Chase also indicated that the phrase "in the several states" does
not refer to 'where the rights are protectable, but designates the kind of
rights protectable, i.e., "privileges and immunities of citizens of the sev-
eral states."
In 1811 Justice Cabell of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ad-
dressed himself to the Privileges and Immunities Clause and said: "The
Constitution of the United States has wisely given to a citizen of each
state the privileges of a citizen of any other state . . ." He added: "Al-
though a citizen of one state may hold land in another, yet he cannot
interfere in those rights, which, from the very nature of society and
19. Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. and McHen. 535, 553 (1797).
20. Id. at 554.
21. Id.
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of government, belong exclusively to the citizens of that state. Such are
the rights of election and of representation. ." .2 In other words, the
clause protected not political rights such as office-holding, but the basic,
natural rights, such as freedom to acquire and hold property.
In 1812 in the New York case of Livingston v. Van Ingen, which up-
held various New York statutes giving a steamboat monopoly to certain
individuals, two justices of the court had occasion to allude to the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause. Justice Yates first remarked: "The Con-
stitution of the United States intends that the same immunities and
privileges shall be extended to all the citizens equally, for the wise pur-
pose of preventing local jealousies, which discriminations (always
deemed odious) might otherwise produce." 23 Chancellor Kent then
wrote: "The provision that the citizens of each state shall be entided
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states has noth-
ing to do with this case. It means only that citizens of other states shall
have equal rights with our own citizens, and not that they shall have
different or greater rights. Their persons and property must, in all re-
spects, be equally subject to our law. This is a very clear proposition,
and the provision itself was taken from the Articles of Confederation." 24
The clause was intended to protect rights of "persons and property" in
the language of Kent. If there is any uncertainty as to Kent's meaning,
it can here be stated that he unqualifiedly accepted the fundamental
rights interpretation of the clause given eleven years later by Justice
Washington, about which more in a moment. The language of Justice
Yates surely merits the conclusion that he acknowledged a national
citizenship entitling citizens to uniform basic privileges and immunities
everywhere in the United States, not at all dependent upon the laws
of either the state of origin or destination.
In 1821 the Privileges and Immunities Clause was before the Delaware
Chancery Court and again the justices were agreed that the privileges
and immunities were the basic, fundamental, natural rights of men.
Justice Ridgely said: "The words 'privileges and immunities' compre-
hend all the rights, and all the methods of protecting those rights, which
belong to a person in a state of civil society, subject to be sure, to some
restrictions, but to such only as the welfare of society and the general
good require." 25 Among such privileges and immunities, according to
22. Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 373, 398 (1811).
23. 9 Johns. Cas. 507, 561 (1812).
24. Id. at 577.
25. Douglas v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 469 (1821).
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Justice Ridgely, were these liberties that the American community con-
sidered to be basic natural rights: rights to enjoy and defend life and
liberty, rights to acquire and protect reputation and property, the con-
tract right, the right to sue, the right of locomotion. Chief Justice Johns
acquiesced with the natural right interpretation of the clause, and
readily acknowledged that the right to acquire and hold real property
was such a right. The privileges and immunities were not those of the
state from which the individual came, nor rights given by the second
state where litigation occurred-they were privileges or rights common
in all the states. Johns wrote: "The privileges and immunities secured
to all citizens of the United States are such only as belong to the citizens
of the several States; which includes the whole United States, and must
be understood to mean, such privileges as should be common, or the
same in every State." 26 So that there can be no doubt of the rights
protected by the clause, Chief Justice Johns repeated: "They are all
privileges common in the Union." 27
JUSTICE BUSHROD WASHINGToN-CoRFIELD V. CORYELL
In 1823 arose the first federal court case involving the .Privileges and
Immunities Clause. It was the case of Corfield v. Coryell,28 and it was
an action in trespass on the theory that the defendant had wrongly
seized a vessel of the plaintiff's. The defense was that New Jersey
statutes allowed the taking of vessels used in New Jersey waters by non-
resident fishermen. The plaintiff countered by arguing that such legis-
lation "is contrary to the second section of the Fourth Article of the
Constitution of the United States, by denying to the citizens of other
states, rights and privileges enjoyed by those of New Jersey." 29 Not
so, ruled the court, holding for the defendant. The taking of oysters
in New Jersey waters can by the law of that State be limited to citizens
of New Jersey, according to the decision.
Much more important than the decision is the language of Justice
Bushrod Washington of the United States Supreme Court who was
presiding in the case at the circuit. His opinion is without question the
foremost judicial exposition of the clause. No subsequent decision in
state or federal court has failed to quote it and to rely upon it. It has
26. Id. at 476-7.
27. Id. at 477.
28. 6 F. Cas. 546 (CC ED Pa, 1823).
29. Id. at 549.
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never been questioned by any capable scholar and it has never been
repudiated by a higher court. This landmark of the law is from begin-
ning to end an unqualified acceptance of the thesis here advanced,
namely, that the privileges and immunities protected under Article IV
are not those graciously accorded to its citizens by a state of sojourn,
but the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the several or
United States-the natural, fundamental rights of free men everywhere.
The language of Justice Washington is important enough to be quoted
in extenso (as it has been hundreds of times). It follows:
The next question is, whether this act infringes that section of
the Constitution which declares that 'the citizens of each shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states?' The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in con-
fining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, how-
ever, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject, nevertheless,
to sudh restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professioinal pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the bene-
fit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions
of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose
of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of
the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges
and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is
to be exercised. These, and many others which might be men-
tioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other
1967]
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state, was manifested calculated (to use the expressions of the
preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of
Confederation) 'the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friend-
ship and intercourse among the people of the different states of
the Union.' But we cannot accede to the proposition which was
insisted on by the counsel, that, under this provision of the Con-
stitution, the citizens of the several states are permitted to par-
ticipate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens
of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they
are enjoyed by those citizens; much less, that in regulating the use
of the common property of the citizens of such such state, the
legislature is bound to extend to the citizens of all other states the
same advantages as are secured to their own citizens.30
This language of Justice Bushrod Washington was constitutional ortho-
doxy for the following forty-five years. Every scholar and every court
paid homage to its fundamental right interpretation of the clause.
Graham has recorded "the tremendous hold of Justice Washington's
dictum in Corfield v. Coryell upon men's thinking in these matters." 11
Indeed, it would be almost impossible to overestimate the importance
of the above quotation upon American law.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause inevitably came in for discussion
in the Dred Scott Case.32 The truly misguided and catastrophic opinion
of Chief Justice Taney hardly deserves to be disinterred, but this aspect
of the opinion has been so frequently misunderstood by those who
wanted to find some antecedent authority to justify the perversion of
Paul v. Virginia, that it had better be closely analyzed. In Dred Scott,
Taney asked if a Negro could "become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities guarantied by that instrument (the Constitu-
tion) to the citizen," adding immediately thereafter: "one of which rights
is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States." 31 Isn't it
beyond dubiety that, even to Taney, the privileges and immunities of
Article Four were not to be defined by the law of any state of sojourn?
There is an interesting aside at this point by Taney. He states here
"that the words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synony-
mous terms and mean the same thing" 34 This is indeed remarkable, for
30. Id. at 551-2.
31. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. Rv. 3, 12 (1954).
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
33. ld. at 403.
34. Id. at 404.
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if true the clause was intended to protect "the people of the United
States."
Taney comprehended fully that the constitutional clause was in-
tended to accomplish the identical objective as the clause in the Articles
of Confederation. "This clause of the Articles is the same in principle
with that inserted in the Constitution," he wrote.
35
Most importantly, Chief Justice Taney openly repudiates the notion
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to be defined by what a
second state grants. Speaking of the argument that Negroes were citi-
zens, Taney said:
And if persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and of
the United States, they would be entitled to all of these privileges
and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict
them; for they would hold these privileges and immunities under
the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Con-
stitution and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.
And if the States could limit or restrict them, or place the party
in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be un-
meaning and could have no operation; and would give no rights
to the citizens when in another State. He would have none but
what the State itself chose to allow him.
This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in
question. And these rights are of a character that would lead to
consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African
race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and
were not in contemplation of the framers of the Constitution
when these privileges and immunities were provided for the pro-
tection of the citizen in other States.3 6
Taney could hardly have been more emphatic in negating the notion
that was to become law in Paul v. Virginia. The privileges and immuni-
ties of Article Four, he assuredly attests, are not to hinge upon what
any state thought them to be. These are fundamental rights, important
privileges and immunities for which Taney thought the Negroes were
not then ready.
In the Dred Scott case another opinion deals with the clause and it,
too, subscribed wholeheartedly to the fundamental rights interpretation
35. Id. at 419.
36. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
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of the clause. According to Justice Curtis, the privileges and immuni-
ties were not rights given by any state, but those "as belonged to general
citizenship." Curtis added:
Nowhere else in the Constitution is there anything concerning
a general citizenship; but here, privileges and immunities to be
enjoyed throughout the United States, under and by force of the
national compact, are granted and secured. In selecting those who
are to enjoy those national rights of citizenship, how are they de-
scribed? As citizens of each State. It is to them these national
rights are secured. The qualification for them is not to be looked
for in any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. They are to be citizens of the several States, and, as such
the privileges and immunities of general citizenship, derived and
guarantied by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed by them.
7
To Curtis, as to Taney, as to Bushrod Washington, as to all the scholars
of the period preceding 1868, the privileges and immunities of Article
Four were not rights allowed by a second state to its people to be
shared in by visitors-they were "national rights of citizenship," "priv-
ileges and immunities of general citizenship," commonly held basic and
fundamental rights; what the Founding Fathers denominated natural
rights.
In the period before Paul v. Virginia not only the United States
Supreme Court, but state tribunals as well, properly accorded a funda-
mental rights interpretation to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. As
late as 1866 the Indiana Supreme Court held void constitutional and
statutory clauses of that State providing that no Negro should enter the
State and voiding all contracts entered into therein by Negroes. It
would not be enough, according to the court, that thereunder Negroes
from other states were treated equally with Indiana Negroes; all citizens
from sister states were entitled under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Federal Compact to the basic, fundamental rights, and
these, ruled the court, necessarily embraced freedom of contract, as
well as the right to "the enjoyment of life and liberty." 38
That the fundamental right interpretation of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article Four prevailed over all these years can not
be denied by the Supreme Court. Indeed, it has been acknowledged by
that body as recently as 1939. "At one time," admitted Justice Roberts
37. Id. at 580.
38. Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 302 (1866).
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speaking for the majority of the Court in Hague v. C.I.O., "it was
thought that this section recognized a group of rights which, according
to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as 'natural rights,' and
that the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the
United States guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition
of this group of rights by every State. Such was the view of Justice
Washington." 19
THE CONGRESSIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING PAUL v. VIRGINIA
Utterances of our national legislative leaders in both the United
States Senate and the House of Representatives during the eighteen fifties
and sixties provide irrefutable evidence that legislators were in complete
agreement with the judiciary that the privileges and immunities to be
protected by Article Four were the basic, fundamental, natural rights
of men.
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, probably the one person
more than any other responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment in the
House, clearly stated his belief that the privileges and immunities of
Article Four were the rights of United States citizenship, which he
defined in typical natural right language as "those rights, common to all
men," privileges and immunities which "no man or state may right-
fully take away." The clause, he reflected, would be "senseless and a
mockery" if it did not safeguard American citizens in their "rights of
life and liberty and property," as well as assure them "due protection
in the enjoyment thereof by law." 40
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois was the principal draftsman of
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act, the Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and probably the outstanding
constitutional lawyer in that body. in debates on January 29, 1866,
Senator Trumbull spoke of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourth Article and queried: "What rights are secured to the citizens
of each State under that provision?" His answer: "Such fundamental
rights as belong to every free person." 41 He added that every person
going into a second state "is entitled to the great fundamental rights
of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the right to travel, to go
39. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 US 496, 511 (1939).
40. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 984.
41. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474-5.
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where he pleases." 42 After President Johnson had vetoed the Civil
Rights Bill, Senator Trumbull rose in the Senate and persuaded that
house to override the presidential veto. He began by posing the ques-
tion, "WZhat rights do citizens of the United States have?" He re-
sponded: "To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some
rights .... They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong
to free citizens or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated
in this bill43 and they belong to them in all the States of the Union. The
right of American citizenship means something." These rights, he said,
are "known as natural rights." 4
Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa was co-author of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the House and
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House. On March 1, 1866,
Wilson spoke of the privileges and immunities of Article Four and
asked: "What are those rights?" He answered: "The great funda-
mental rights." "Civil rights are the natural rights of man," continued
Representative Wilson. Among them were "freedom of religious
opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the rights of assemblage for
the purpose of petition," as well as the broadly stated rights of personal
liberty, security and property. He observed: "Before our Constitution
was formed, the great fundamental rights.., belonged to every person
who became a member of our great national family. No one sur-
rendered a jot or tittle of these rights by consenting to the formation
of the Government." There would be no need for the proposed Civil
Rights Bill, according to James Wilson, if all the states would but honor
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four.45
Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan, opening the debate on the
contemplated Fourteenth Amendment on May 23, 1866, stated: "It
would be a curious question to solve what are the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of each of the States in the several States. I do not
42. Id. at 475.
43. The rights named in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill (as vell as in Section 7 of
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill) were these:
(a) the right to make and enforce contracts;
(b) the right to buy, sell and own realty and personalty;
(c) the right to sue, to be parties to litigation, to give evidence;
(d) the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property.
14 Stat. 27.
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1757.
45. Id. at 1115-9.
[Vol. 9: 1
PAUL'S PERVERTED PRIVILEGES
propose to go at any length into that question at this time." He cer-
tainly, however, acquiesced in the fundamental right interpretation.
After repeating to the Senate at length the famous quotation from
Justice Washington, Senator Howard agreed: "Such is the character
of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the
Fourth Article of the Constitution." 46
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio spoke in the 39th Congress
with reference to the privileges and immunities. He first observed that
"there are some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every
citizen which cannot be abolished or abridged by state constitutions or
laws." After asking what the "inherent and indestructible" rights were,
Lawrence responded as follows:
Every citizen . . . has the absolute right to life, the right to
personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and
enjoy property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary in-
cidents of these absolute rights, there are others, as the right to
make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold and enjoy property,
and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and
property.47
Senator John Sherman of Ohio also spoke in the 39th Congress in
reference to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth Article,
and his words established beyond any doubt that the rights protected
were the basic, general rights of American citizens. Sherman tated:
"There never was any doubt about the construction of this clause of the
Constitution-that is, that a man who was recognized as a citizen of one
state had a right to go anywhere within the United States and exercise
the immunities of a citizen of the United States." 4
8
On March 8, 1866, during debates on the Civil Rights Bill, Representa-
tive John Broomall of Pennsylvania defended its necessity because cer-
tain states had habitually denied the privileges and immunities of Article
Four to citizens of other states. What were the denied rights? Mainly
these, said Broomall: "The right of speech, the right of transit, the
right of domicil, the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the
right of petition." 49 His fellow representative from Pennsylvania, Mar-
tin Thayer, was in accord that the bill was needed to protect "these
46. Id. at 2765.
47. Id. at 1832.
48. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW, 185-6 (1965).
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1263.
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fundamental rights and immunities which are common to the humblest
citizen of every free State." 5o
Even President Johnson understood the privileges and immunities to
be fundamental and precious rights. In vetoing the Civil Rights Bill he
indicated he was doing so because he thought Negroes were not then
ready to share these important rights. Rhetorically he asked: "Can it
be reasonably supposed that they possess the requisite qualifications to
entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
-United States?" 51
The foregoing should be ample to prove that the leaders of the
Congress would have unhesitatingly negated any notion that the privi-
leges and immunities of Article Four were to be defined by what the
state of sojourn might allow to its own people. They knew, as had the
preceding generations, that-the rights thereby protected were the com-
mon rights of free men, the basic, fundamental, natural rights.
THE VIEWS OF AMERICAN SCHOLARS IN THE PERIOD PRECEDING
PAUL V. VIRGINIA
American scholars of the years preceding 1868 generally accepted the
fundamental rights interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article Four. After Justice Washington's language in Corfield v.
Coryell, such interpretation met with veritable unanimity from the
American scholarly community.
In 1822 Thomas Sergeant, in his popular Constitutional Law, noted
the case of Campbell v. Morris, previously alluded to, and interpreted
it as holding "that the citizens of all the States should have the peculiar
advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as personal property,
and that such property should be protected and secured by the laws
of the State, in the same manner as the property of the citizens of the
State is protected .. 52 To Sergeant this basic right of property be-
longed to all as citizens of the United States, not as a gift from the state
of sojourn.
'Villiam Rawle's book, The Constitution of the United States of
America, written in 1825, was deemed authoritative by the American
bar. Rawle wrote: "In the second section of the fourth article it is
provided that the citizens of each state, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states, and the same rule had
been ambiguously laid down in the articles of confederation. If this
50. Id. at 1151.
51. Id. at 1679.
52. SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 384 (1822).
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clause is retained, and its utility and propriety cannot be questioned, the
consequence would be,, that if each state retained the power of naturali-
zation, it might impose on all the other states, such citizens as it might
think proper .... The evil could not be better remedied than by vesting
the exclusive power.in Congress. It cannot escape notice that no defini-
tion of the nature and rights of citizens appears in the Constitution. The
descriptive term is used, with a plain indication that its meaning is
understood by all .... ' 51 Rawle indicated that this was the customary
approach of the .Constitution, which document assumed certain things,
including theproposition that citizens "possess an unqualified right to
the enjoyment of property and personal immunity." 54 "Every person
born within the United States," continued Rawle, "is entitled to all the
rights and privileges appertaining to that capacity." 5 He concluded:
"There are certain incidents to the character of a citizen of the United
States, with which the.-separate states cannot interfere." 51 Thus, at
least by 1825, it was clear that certain basic, fundamental rights (such
as "the enjoyment .of property and personal immunity") were inevitable
concomitants of United States citizenship, that is privileges and immuni-
tise of citizens, and that. they could not be negated by the states.
Chancellor Kent, writing in the Second Edition of his Commentaries
in 1832, accepted the interpretation of Justice Bushrod Washington in
Corfield v. Coryell. In that case, wrote Kent, "It was declared that the
privileges and immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United
States to citizens of the several States were to be confined to those which
were, in their nature, fundamental, and belonged of right to the citizens
of all free Governments." "Such," explained Kent by way of illustra-
tion, "are the. rights ,of protection of life and liberty, to acquire and
enjoy property.".57
Joseph Story, writing in 1833 in his Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States, was somewhat more equivocal. He wrote
that in regard to citizens of each state, "The intention of this clause was
to confer on them -a general citizenship; and to communicate all the
privileges and immunities which citizens of the same state would be en-
titled to under the like circumstances." 58 The statement is paradoxical
53. RAWLE, THE CONSTITUTION OF TE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 79 (lst Ed. 1825).
54. Id. at.80.
55. Id. at 80.
56. Id. at 81.
.57. 2 KENT,.COMMEN.TARIES, 71-2 (1832).
58. 3 STORY, COMM-AENrARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
and contradictory. If the privileges and immunities were to be only
those acknowledged by the second state to its people, there would be
no significance to the rights of general citizenship which Story admitted
it was the purpose of this clause to confer. Story cited in support of
this language the following: "Corfield v. Coryell, Sergeant on the Con-
situation, Livingston v. Van Ingen," all of which, as previously noted,
supported the fundamental rights view of the clause. Admittedly Story
might have better expressed his affirmation of this interpretation.
If there was any doubt in Story's mind, it was not shared by his fellow
citizens of Boston who repeatedly through these years expressed their
understanding of the fundamental right interpretation of the clause and
congressional power flowing from the same. In 1836, for example,
citizens of Massachusetts in a petition to their legislature complained
forcefully that the privileges and immunities of free Negro seamen
from Massachusetts were constantly violated by the laws of Georgia and
the Carolinas under which they were summarily imprisoned when they
there entered port. Such laws, said the petition "deprive a portion of
our fellow citizens of this commonwealth of the privileges and rights
guaranteed to them by our federal Constitution . . . and even to the
deprivation of their liberty for life ... in utter disregard of that article
.. . which explicitly provides that 'the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.' "5sA Seven years later, one hundred and fifty leading citizens of
Story's Boston petitioned the United States Congress to exercise its
constitutional power under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
protect "the privileges of citizenship, secured by the Constitution of the
United States." The petition was referred in the House to the Com-
mittee on Commerce which shortly returned a report acknowledging
the majority's acceptance of the theory of the petitioners.0 9
William Goodell, writing in 1844, asserted that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was intended to protect both white citizens of north-
ern states who went into the South to speak against slavery, as well as
free colored citizens of northern states whose work took them, usually
as seamen, into southern states.60 By 1847, notes tenBroek, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was "widely invoked" in connection with these
58A. Quoted in Graham, Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1950 Wisc. L. REv. 610, 645-6.
59. TENBRoEK, supra note 48 at 103-4.
60. GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ITS BEARING UPON AMERI-
CAN SLAvERY (1844), cited by TENBROEK, supra note 59 at 75.
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circumstances. 6 1 In that year, James Birney had written a number of
articles in the Albany Patriot arguing that Congress had full power to
abolish slavery. He, too, claimed the southern states were violating
the Privileges and Immunities Clause by jailing colored seamen who
were free citizens from northern states. Among the important privileges
and immunities, according to Birney, were freedom of movement and
freedom of speech.
62
In 1849 Joel Tiffany wrote that the privileges and immunities con-
sisted of the natural and inalienable rights of men, such as the enjoy-
ment of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.6
The assumption throughout these years previous to 1868, entertained
by jurists, legislators and scholars was that proper constitutional law
would not permit a state to strip its own citizens of their natural rights,
and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four would
equally protect citizens from other states if they were ever exposed to
the denial of such rights. An alleged "inadequacy" of the Fourth
Article is traditionally repeated: it seems to provide no protection to
a citizen from his own state. This is extremely academic and fanciful.
No state compelled by the article to respect the basic, fundamental,
natural rights of citizens from other states would be about to acknowl-
edge fewer rights to its own citizens. In any event, the latter had the
protection of the state constitution, drafted with conscious dedication
to the doctrine of natural rights. And, if for some reason, the state
courts and state constitutions would not adequately protect their own
citizens, scholars and jurists were already suggesting that the federal
courts and the United States Constitution could properly protect a
citizen of the United States in his fundamental rights, his privileges and
immunities of citizenship, when denied by his own state. The theories
were principally three: (1) the guaranty of a republican form of gov-
ernment assured individuals that their own states would have to respect
those natural rights which were characteristic of a republican form of
government; (2) the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, when
read together with the necessary and proper clause, not only restrained
but also empowered the federal government; and (3) there was a United
States citizenship with attendant rights as well as obligations, and the
federal government had inherent power to protect its own citizens in the
exercise of such rights.
61. TENBROEK, supra note 48 at 80.
62. Id. at 79-80.
63. Id. at 113.
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PAUL V. VIRGINIA
In 1868, for the first time, the Supreme Court held in Paul v. Vir-
ginia" that the privileges and immunities of Article Four were only
those accorded by the state of sojourn. Justice Field, speaking for the
Court, announced: "The privileges and immunities secured to citizens
of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are
those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the
latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being
citizens." Field submitted:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place
the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of
other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in
those states are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities
of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation
against them by other States, it gives them the right of free in-
gress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those
States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the
pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the
equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no pro-
vision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the
citizens of the United States one people as this.65
Let it be clearly understood what Field had decided: if a person from
New York, for example, went to Mississippi and was totally denied
freedom of speech, assembly, movement, petition, press, access to the
courts, and even the writ of habeas corpus, it would all be constitutional
so long as the citizens of Mississippi had regularly been denied the same
rights! Thus, through Field and his colleagues, the privileges and im-
munities of the Fourth Article became only those liberties a second
state might choose to grant to its own people, as niggardly as this might
be. No longer would the clause protect the "common rights of free
citizens," all "fundamental," "natural" rights. What a triumph of
parochialism over humanitarianism!
It is rather amazing Field's sympathetic biographer, in what is gen-
64. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
65. 75 U.S. (8 Wail.) at 180.
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erally thought to be the definitive work on the Justice, nowhere men-
tions his opinion in Paul v. Virginia.6 It would hardly be a desirable
epitaph.
Field's contemporaries on the Court were not altogether impressed
with either the logic or propriety of his conclusion. Only two years
later, in Ward v. Maryland, 6 the-Supreme Court defined the privileges
and immunities of Article Four not by the law of the second state, but
by "the common law." They added, for good measure, that the words
"privileges and immunities" "are words of very comprehensive mean-
ing." ,s
It was the natural right interpretation of Justice Bushrod Washington
that was accepted by the Court in Wfard v. Maryland, and this the
tribunal has itself admitted. In 1873, speaking for the Court in the
Slaughter House Cases, Justice Miller referred to Washington's opinion
in Corfield v. Coryell and then added:
This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
States is adopted in the main by this Court in the recent case of
Ward v. State of Maryland, while it declines to undertake an
authoritative definition beyond what was necessary to that de-
cision. The description, *when taken to include others not named,
but which are of the same general character, embraces nearly
every civil right for the establishment and protection of which
organized government is instituted. They are, in the language of
Judge Washington, those rights which are fundamental. 9
Furthermore, Justice Bradley in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-
house Cases accepts the same fundamental right theory of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article Four. "The language of the Clause,"
he said, ". . . seems fairly susceptible of a broader interpretation than
that which makes it a guarantee of mere equality of privileges with
other citizens." 70 Justice Bradley continued: "It is the Privileges and
Immunities of citizens, that is, of citizens as such, that are to be accorded
66. CmAR BRENT SVISHER, STEPtmN J. FmLm, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930).
67. Ward v. Maryland 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 430 (1871).
68. Id.
69. Slaughter House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873).
70. Id. at 118.
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to citizens of other States when they are found in any State; or, as Jus-
tice Washington says, 'Privileges and Immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free
goverments.' " 71
The parade of judicial accolades to Bushrod Washington was even
joined by Justice Field in his dissent in the Slaughter House Cases. Speak-
ing of Washington's classical statement, Field indicated: "This appears
to me to be a sound construction of the clause in question. The privileges
and immunities designated are those which of right belong to the citi-
zens of all free governments." 72 Poor Field! If he could use this funda-
mental right language of Washington and know what he was doing,
he must have understood the immensity of his error in Paul v. Virginia
where he had perverted the clause to protect only rights acknowledged
by a state of sojourn. By now, Field understood that freedom of enter-
prise is one of the basic, natural rights that all along should have been
protected under the Fourth Article. Speaking of the privileges and
immunities of that article, Field stated: "Clearly among these must
be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner,
without other restraint than such as equally affects all persons." 7 Gone
was the localism of second state law, and once again-as in all the years
past-the privileges and immunities were the basic, natural rights.
One can almost visualize the tragic mien of Justice Field that day
when the Slaughter House Case was decided. He, more than anyone
else in American history, had been responsible for emasculating the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth Article. Now the
majority of his brethren refuse under the recently enacted privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Field's
treasured rights of property and enterprise. It would be easy to deny
sympathy to Field after he had been responsible for this blundering
mischief, but the tragedy has been not alone his but the nation's.
Should any reader need further proof that Justice Field knew the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four was intended to pro-
tect the basic, fundamental, natural rights of men, let him peruse the
Justice's concurring opinion in Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,
71. ld. at 117-118.
72. id at 97. Italics beginning with the word "which" are those of Field; previously
those of the present author.
73. Id. at 97.
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decided in 1883. Speaking of such rights as "the right to peaceably as-
semble," and their safeguards before the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Field said: "The States could not previously have inter-
fered with there privileges and immunities, or any other privileges and
immunities which citizens enjoyed under the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Any attempted impairment of them could have been
as successfully resisted then as now." 74 Of course, he is here perfectly
correct. Here by definition and illustration, the Fourth Article's privi-
leges and immunities are the fundamental rights-rights not given by the
laws of the state of sojourn, but rights "enjoyed under the Constitution
and laws of the United States." If every Supreme Court justice is en-
tided to one monumental mistake, it nevertheless should not be of the
enormity of Field's decision in Paul v. Virginia.
The cause of Field's mistake in Paul v. Virginia can likely be found
in the events of that year. On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State Seward
had given a formal promulgation of ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the fall of that same year, with the newly enacted
Amendment's privileges and immunities clause foremost in the minds
of the legal community, Field almost certainly thought that he could
safely strip the Fourth Article's Privileges and Immunities Clause of its
real content in the belief (shared by thousands of his fellow citizens)
that the new privileges and immunities clause would adequately protect
the fundamental rights, including the rights of property and enterprise
so cherished by Field. As the Slaughter House Cases soon proved, how
reckless an assumption and how wrong a forecast!
PRE-FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT FEDERAL POWER TO PROTECT THE.
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS
The foregoing should have convinced a reader that even before the
Fourteenth Amendment there was a United States citizenship, and that
every American citizen possessed certain rights, privileges and immum-
ties. Indeed, it was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four
which was the prime recognition of national citizenship. Representative
James M. Ashley of Ohio, speaking in Congress on January 6, 1865,
during debates on the contemplated Thirteenth Amendment, stated:
74. Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 US 746, 760 (1883) (concurring).
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"... we ought not to overlook that provision of the Constitution which
secures nationality of citizenship. The Constitution guarantees that the
citizens of each State shall enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens
of the several States. It is a universal franchise which cannot be con-
fined to States, but belongs to the citizens of the Republic." 7
Chief Justice Roger Taney, whom one could hardly label an extreme
nationalist, in 1849 acknowledged that there was a United States citizen-
ship with certain attendant rights. Said Taney: "We are all citizens of
the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interrup-
tion, as freely as in our own States." 76 Such right, Taney knew, owed
its existence to no state-it was a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship.
Virtually all the jurists, legislators and scholars previously cited as
recognizing a United States citizenship, acknowledged that the federal
government, long before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
had a necessary power to protect the rights of United States citizens-
customarily referred to in those days as their "privileges and immuni-
ties."
It was in cases decided under Article IV, Section 2 that the United
States Supreme Court first ruled that Congress "by necessary implica-
tion" had power to enforce upon the states their obligations announced
in that Section. The Fugitive Slave Law, enacted in 1793 pursuant to
clause three of that section, came before the Supreme Court in 1842
and that tribunal, through Justice Story, sustained the congressional
enactment intended to protect the property right in slaves.76A
Again, in 1860 the United States Supreme Court held Congress had
the implied power to enforce Article IV, Section 2. In Kentucky v.
Dennison, the Court was concerned with another 1793 Act of Congress
passed pursuant to clause two of the section imposing upon the states
the obligation to extradite to other states persons charged with crimes.
Once more Chief Justice Taney spoke for the Court in upholding the
power of Congress to implement the second section of Article Four. He
stated: "This duty of providing by law the regulations necessary to
75. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 139.
76. The Passenger Cases 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (dissenting).
76A. Prigg v. Pennsylvania 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-20 (1842).
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carry this compact into execution, from the nature of the duty and the
object in view was manifestly devolved upon Congress ..." All
subsequent cases concerned with this statute have recognized and ac-
cepted its constitutionality.
Our national legislators understood that Congress had power to pro-
tect the Article Four privileges and immunities. Senator Trumbull
explained that this was so because "Allegiance and protection are
reciprocal rights." 77 On a number of other occasions he attested the
existence of federal power to, protect the basic privileges and im-
munities. On January 29, 1866, speaking in the Congress of Negroes
as "being now free and citizens of the United States," he added: "As
citizens they are entitled ... to the great fundamental rights belong-
ing to free citizens, and we have a right to protect them in the enjoy-
ment of them." '8 When asked on that occasion what the term "civil
rights" in the proposed bill meant, Senator Trumbull named those in
the bill and then observed: "These I understand to be civil rights,
fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man, and which
under the Constitution as it now exists we have a right to protect every
man in." 79 Senator Trumbull asserted a broad power in Congress to pro-
tect the privileges and immunities, against not only state but individual
negation. Having reference to the South Carolina mob that drove
Samuel Hoar of Massachusetts from the former state when he attempted
to defend some free Negro seamen, Trumbull asked rhetorically: "Is
it not manifest that it was competent for the Congress of the United
States to have passed a law' that would have protected Mr. Hoar who
went from Massachusetts to South Carolina for the purpose of testing
a question in the courts?" 80 Again, in introducing the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill in the Senate, Trumbull urged that the Congress had power
"to secure freedom to all persons within the United States, and protect
every individual in the full enjoyment of the rights of persons and
property and furnish him with means for their vindication." 81
76B. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 US (24 How.) 66, 104-5 (1860). Note, also, the state-
ment of Chief Justice Beasley: "I can entertain no count of the power of Congress to
vest in any National officer the authority to cause the arrest in any State of a fugitive
from the justice of another State." In re Voorhees 32 NJL 140, 146 (1867).
77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1757.
78. Id. at 475.
79. Id. at 476.
80. ld. at 475.
81. Id. at 77.
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In the 39th Congress, Representative Wilson told his colleagues that
no amendment to the Constitution was necessary to protect fundamental
rights since the possession of rights by citizens necessarily conferred
by implication the power upon Congress to provide by appropriate
legislation for their protection. - Representative Wilson's utterances
deserve full quotation. He said:
I assert that we possess the power to do those things which Gov-
ernments are organized to do; that we may protect a citizen of the
United States against a violation of his rights by the law of a single
State; that by our laws and our courts we may intervene to main-
tain the proud character of American citizenship; that ihis power
permeates our whole system, is a part of it, without which the
States can run riot over every fundamental right belonging to
citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this power
depends upon no express delegation but runs with the rights it is
designed to protect...s3
Again, on March 9, 1866, Wilson stated: "I re-affirm here today that
the citizens of the United States, as such, are entitled to certain rights;
and.. . it is the duty of the Government to protect citizens in the per-
fect enjoyment of them." 84
This was the general view of Congressmen in the period preceding
1868. For example, in the 39th Congress Representative Lawrence of
Ohio remarked: "Certainly, then, in aid of Article IV, Section 2 ...
Congress has large incidental powers to enforce its observance, so es-
sential to preserve the national life and the means of national exist-
ence . .." 85
The understanding that the federal government had necessary power
to protect the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States was not limited to Congress, or to the Civil War decade. One can
recall Alexander Hamilton's remark in the Federalist Papers that since
the privileges and immunities of Article IV were federal rights it would
be only natural that they should be protectable by federal machinery. 6
82. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1294.
83. Id. at 1119.
84. Id. at 1294.
85. Id. at 1836.
86. T-mE FEDERAuST No. 80 at 238 (Hamilton).
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Joel Tiffany, writing in 1849, indicated that the federal congress had
constitutional power to protect, even against state action, negations of
the privileges and immunities of the Fourth Article which he asserted
were the fundamental and natural rights of free men."7 Charles Sum-
ner, too, on many occasions stated that the Congress had power to guar-
antee and protect the natural rights of our people.81 Indeed, this was a
widely held understanding of our people. To illustrate, an 1860 anti-
slavery convention in Worcester, Massachusetts, resolved that "It is the
duty of the national government to protect all inhabitants of the country
in the enjoyment of all their natural rights." 89
This view of federal power flowing from (a) the second section of
the Fourth Article read together with the necessary and proper clause;
(b) the guaranty of a republican form of government clause; (c)
the due process clause; or (d) the theory of necessary or inherent
power to protect rights of United States citizens, admittedly was not
universally held. There were some like Representative John Bingham
who questioned the existence of federal power while castigating the
states for their disregard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourth Article. "No State," said Bingham, "ever had the right ... to
abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic al-
though many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that
without remedy." 90 To provide an adequate remedy Bingham felt the
Fourteenth Amendment was needed.
THE RELEVANCE BETWEEN THE FOURTH ARTICLE'S PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND THE FREEDM£EN'S BUREAU BILL AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
In the period immediately following the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment Congress implemented that Amendment's ban on the im-
position of "badges of servitude" upon our people with two particular
bills: the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill. Both were
enacted by the Congress, both vetoed by President Johnson, but the
latter was passed over the presidential veto to become the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
This legislation was necessary according to the Congressional leader-
ship because the southern states for many years had regularly-and
87. Cited in TENBROEX, supra, note 48 at 113.
88. Id. at 170-1.
89. Id. at 151.
90. CoNG. GLoBF, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542.
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successfully-denied the privileges and immunities of Article Four not
only to Negroes but also to white citizens of the northern states so-
journing in the south. Speaking to the House, Representative Broom-
all of Pennsylvania remarked: "For thirty years prior to 1860 every-
body knows that the rights and immunities of citizens were habitually
denied in certain states to the citizens of other states." 91 The same point
was made in the upper chamber by Senator Lyman Trumbull. Speaking
on January 29, 1866, with reference to the Civil Rights Bill, Senator
Trumbull reflected:
Of what avail was it to the citizen of Massachusetts, who, a few
years ago, went to South Carolina to enforce a constitutional right
in court, that the Constitution of the United States declared that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states?
9 2
Both bills enumerated what Congress concluded were among the
privileges and immunities which needed immediate protection. They
were these: (a) the right to make and enforce contracts; (b) the right
to buy, sell and own real and personal property; (c) the right to sue,
be parties in litigation, and be witnesses in court; and (d) the right to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property.
93
In enacting these bills, it was the congressional intent to protect all
American citizens, Negro and white, in the possession of these Fourth
Article privileges and immunities. Representative Garfield of Ohio,
speaking on the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, said it must be made true in
fact, as well as in law, that "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 94 Of the
companion Civil Rights Bill, Senator Howard of Michigan stated: "It
is to secure to these men whom we have made free the ordinary rights
of a freeman and nothing else." 95 In the House Representative Thayer
of Pennsylvania declared that the same bill was to protect "these funda-
91. Id. at 1263.
92. Id. at 474.
93. 14 Star. 27.
94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Appendix 67.
95. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 504.
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mental rights and immunities which are common to the humblest citizen
of every free State." 96
As noted above Representative Wilson had stated that there would
have been no need for the Bill if the states would have honored the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four. 7 The Bill was neces-
sary, he indicated, to protect "the great fundamental rights" of all
American citizens. Senator Lane of Kansas asserted that the purpose of
the Thirteenth Amendment had been to assure to Negroes "all the
privileges and immunities of other free citizens of the United States,"
and that the object of the Civil Rights Bill was that the freedmen
"shall be secured in possession of all the rights, privileges and im-
munities of free men." 98
Senator John Henderson of Missouri claimed that the aim of the
Civil Rights Bill was "to give the right to hold real and personal estate
to the Negro, to enable him to sue and be sued in courts, to let him
be confronted by his witnesses, to have the process of the courts for
his protection, and enjoy in the respective states those fundamental
rights of person and property which cannot be denied to any person
without disgracing the government itself." The purpose of the Bill was
"simply to carry out" the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Four, according to Senator Henderson.99
The legislative debates definitely establish that neither the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill nor the Civil Rights Bill were intended to create new
rights. Representative Lawrence speaking in regard to the latter legisla-
tion, stated: "It must be clear that this bill creates no new right, con-
fers no new privilege, but is declaratory of what is already the con-
stitutional right of every citizen in every State, that equality of civil
rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and con-
trols all State authority." 10 This was the clear consensus of both
houses. The purpose of both bills, then, was to safeguard some of the
more important privileges and immunities of the Fourth Article-to pro-
tect them for Negroes and whites both, to ensure that they would be
honored by government and individuals alike, not only in states of so-
journ but also in the citizen's own state.
96. Id. at 1151.
97. Id. at 1117-8.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. at 3031.
100. Id. at 1836.
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARTICLE'S PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE TO THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is properly attributable, more than to any other person, to Representa-
tive John Bingham. He recognized and intended that the two clauses
were the same, intended to protect identical rights-namely, the funda-
mental rights, privileges and immunities of free citizens. Bingham sug-
gested to the Congress that there had been "an ellipsis in the language
employed" by the draftsmen of the Fourth Article and that it was
always understood that the words "of the United States" were intended
to follow the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens." "' He
assured the Congress that the only matter new in the Fourteenth
Amendment was the clause giving express legislative power to Congress.
After specifically advertising to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article Four as the basis of our national privileges and immunities,
Bingham affirmed for the House that the new amendment "does not
impose upon any State of the Union, or any citizen of any State of the
Union, any obligation, which is not now enjoined upon them by the
very letter of the Constitution." 02 It could hardly be more lucidly
stated that the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment
were to be those of the original Constitution-the Fourth Article-that
is, the basic, fundamental rights of free men.
The language employed by the Congress in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was so chosen, not to identify or create new rights, but to make
it certain that the rights therein referred to were not deemed attributes
of state citizenship, and not to be defined by any state. It was used, in
the words of Justice Field, to show that "the fundamental rights, privi-
leges and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free
citizen ... are not dependent upon his citizenship of any state." 1o1
In presenting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate,
Senator Howard informed that body that the object of the Amend-
ment was to safeguard "those fundamental rights and privileges which
pertain to citizens of the United States." 'I Howard's associate, Senator
Poland of Vermont stated on June 5, 1866: "The clause of the first
proposed amendment, that 'No State shall make or enforce any law
101. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., 984.
102. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1034.
103. Slaughter House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95 (1872) (dissenting).
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766.
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which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States' secures nothing beyond what was intended by the orig-
inal provision in the Constitution, that 'the citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.' " 105
Senator Poland re-acquainted the upper house with the fact that there
had been "a practical repudiation of the existing provision on this sub-
ject, and it was disregarded in many of the states. State legislation was
allowed to override it, and as no express power was by the Constitution
granted to Congress to enforce it, it became really a dead letter." It
was, Senator Poland said, "eminently proper and necessary that Con-
gress should be invested with the power to enforce this provision
throughout the country and compel its observance." Ill Note that the
implementing clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
enforce "this provision," namely, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourth Article. The Amendment was to make "express" what
had been inferred or resulting powers.
The general-and successful-disregard of the Fourth Article's Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause by the southern states was known by every
Congressman. On June 5, 1866, Senator Howe remarked on such state
denials of privileges and immunities, listing among the rights frequently
denied these: "the right to hold land, .... the right to collect their wages
by the processes of the law," "the right to appear in the courts as
suitors for any wrong done them or any right denied them," and "the
right to give testimony in any court." 101
Senator Trumbull, the most influential man in the Senate during these
years, insisted to his colleagues that the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to be no different from the
like clause in the Fourth Article. It was merely a repetition, said Trum-
bull, "in a little different language." 108 The purpose of the original
clause, Trumbull often stated, was to secure to the citizens of each state
"such fundamental rights as belong to every free person." 109 This was
to be the purpose, too, of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and im-
munities clause.
105. Id. at 2961.
106. Id. at 2961.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Appendix 219.
108. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cohg., 1st Sess.' 576.
109. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474-5.
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The above evidence is irrefutable. The Congress responsible for
proposing the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment expected thereby to provide better protection for the
rights safeguarded by the Fourth Article-rights which the 39th Con-
gress, like all previous generations of Americans, honored as funda-
mental, natural attributes of free men.
As indicated earlier, the majority of the Congress in the 1860s under-
stood that the federal government had power previous to the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States. The congressional leadership agreed
to a constitutional amendment to clarify the doubts of some, such as
John Bingham, as to the existence of federal power to protect civil
rights.
The purpose of the amendment is perfectly described in the language
of the Senate Resolution of February 1, 1866, directing the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction to act. It was "to declare 'vith greater certainty
the power of Congress to enforce and determine by appropriate legis-
lation all the guarantees contained in that instrument (the Constitution),
specifically embracing among the latter that clause "which assures the
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States." 110 The amendment desired was one simply to remove
doubts, to clarify already existing congressional power.
Furthermore, the amendment brought forward by the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction, pursuant to the senatorial directive, evidences
the same recognition of existing power, flowing from a legitimate read-
ing together of the Fourth Article and the necessary and proper clause.
The proposed amendment was primarily a simple amalgam of the two
pre-existent constitutional provisions. Its language was this:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, and to
all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty and property. 1'
Obviously, not much clarification of existing constitutional law was
needed for any fair, objective scholar, according to the Joint Committee
of the Congress. The rights to be protected would be the same rights
110. Id. at 566 (emphasis supplied).
111. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 806, 813.
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safeguarded by the original constitution, and accepted federal power
would simply be spelled out.
Debates in Congress on the fifth section of the proposed amendment
establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the purpose was to express
congressional power in such language as to satisfy the minority of that
body who entertained doubts on this score. It was the object of this
section to carry out the senatorial directive: "to declare 'with greater
certainty the power of Congress." It was particularly to assert clearly
congressional power over the states that the implementing section of the
Amendment was intended. Senator Howard said of this section:
It casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the
future, that all sections of the Amendment are carried out in good
faith, and that no State infringes the rights of persons or property.
I look upon this clause as indispensable for the reason that it thus
imposes upon Congress this power and duty. It enables Congress,
in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of
the Amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal Congres-
sional enactment." 2
"Here," remarked Senator Howard, "is a direct, affirmative delegation
of power to Congress to carry out the principles of all these guarantees,
a power not found in the Constitution." 113 A power that is, that had
until then not been openly expressed.
In the House, Representative Stevens said on May 8th: "This amend-
ment . . . allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the
States." n4Similarly, Representative Hale observed: "It is in effect a
provision under which all state legislation, in its codes of civil and
criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the individual citizen,
may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Con-
gress .established instead." "' Congressmen were specially concerned
with the "Black Codes" and their counterparts whereby the state gov-
ernments had recently begun to deny rights, privileges and immunities
to Negroes and whites, but there is no justification for assuming con-
gressional power was to be limited to these "state" situations. One of
the regularly proclaimed objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to remove doubts that might linger about the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 which certainly applied to individuals.
112. Id. at 2768.
113. Id. at 2766.
114. Id. at 2459.
115. Id. at 1034.
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Traditionally there had been no doubts as to the power of Congress
to reach individuals who denied the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States-the purpose of the implementing clause was to
clarify for all that Congress possessed the same power over the states,
as well. In reporting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate,
Senator Howard informed that body that the object was "to restrain
the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees." 116 The powers of Congress had never
theretofore been limited to "state action" instances, and it is prepos-
terous and unthinkable to suggest that the 39th Congress, concerned
with "clarifying" its existing powers, would have ever intended to pro-
pose a constitutional amendment limiting its powers.
The very first case that arose after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment was United States v. Hall.117 There the federal court un-
hesitatingly ruled that the privileges and immunities referred to in that
amendment were the same as those of the Fourth Article, namely, the
basic, fundamental rights. Judge Woods, speaking for a circuit court,
said: "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States here referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be
denominated fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all
free states, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of
the several states which compose this union from the time of their be-
coming free, independent and sovereign." 18
It was but natural, then, that when counsel arose to argue in the
famous Slaughter House Cases of 1873 that their argument would be
based upon denial of privileges and immunities. According to one of
the counsel in the case, Senator Carpenter,
The phrase 'privileges and immunities of citizens' is not used for
the first time in this Amendment. The original Constitution pro-
vided 'that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' The
privileges and immunities here contemplated are those which are
fundamental, as, for instance, the right of going into any state for
the purpose of residing therein; the right of taking up one's resi-
dence there, and becoming a citizen; the right of free entrance
116. Id. at 2766
117. 26 F. Cas. 79 (1871).
118. Id. at 81.
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and exist, and passage through; the protection of the laws affect-
ing personal liberty.11
In support of this, Carpenter placed reliance upon the renowned opinion
of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell. Surely, a lawyer of the
times could conclude that the privileges and immunities of both the
Fourth Article and the Fourteenth Amendment were the fundamental
rights of free citizens.
In limiting the rights to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
privileges and immunities clause to those which owe their existence
solely to the federal government, the five-to-four majority in the
Slaughter House Cases was wrong. They hopelessly misread both his-
tory and the Congressional debates. The dissenters in that case were
perfectly right in declaring that the privileges and immunities of the
amendment were "the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities,
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen," 1 0 "the natural
and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens," 121 those which are
"fundamental; which belong of right to citizens of all free governments,
and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of several
states." 12 With all this fundamental rights interpretation Justice Field
was, of course, now in whole-hearted agreement, but in emasculating
the Fourth Article's privileges and immunities clause in Paul v. Vir-
ginia, Field had made it possible for the majority in the Slaughter House
Cases to do the same to the like clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Recently Justices Douglas and Goldberg expressed their realization
that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect "the
rights and guarantees of the good old common law." '23 Perhaps their
Court will soon and at long last repudiate both Paul v. Virginia and
the Slaughter House Cases and protect under the privileges and im-
munities clauses "the good old constitutional rights" intended by the
Founding Fathers to be safeguarded by the Fourth Article and by the
Congress responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment-the basic, funda-
mental rights, privileges and immunities of free men. It is not too much
to hope that at the same time the Court will acknowledge what the
Thirty-Ninth Congress and all previous generations accepted without
119. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
120. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95.
121. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96.
122. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97, 117.
123. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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serious question: that Congress has always had power to protect such
rights against invasion by individuals or government. Any "state action"
limitation sometimes thought to be inherent in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is simply erroneous and irrelevant.
